CLAIMS

What is claimed is:

| 1 | 1. A method of preventing an attack on a network, wherein the attack comprises | | |
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| 2 | injecting a spurious transmission control protocol (TCP) segment into a TCP connection | | |
| 3 | between a sender and a receiver, the method comprising the computer-implemented steps of | | |
| 4 | receiving a TCP segment carrying an ACK value; | | |
| 5 | determining whether the ACK value is less than the difference of a next | | |
| 6 | unacknowledged sequence value and a lesser of either (a) a total number of | | |
| 7 | bytes sent in the TCP connection or (b) a maximum window size associated | | |
| 8 | with the TCP connection; and | | |
| 9 | discarding the TCP segment when the ACK value is less than the difference of a next | | |
| 10 | unacknowledged sequence value and the lesser of either (a) the total number | | |
| 11 | of bytes sent in the TCP connection or (b) the maximum window size | | |
| 12 | associated with the TCP connection. | | |

- 1 2. A method as recited in Claim 1, wherein the steps are performed by an endpoint node 2 acting as the receiver of data in the TCP connection.
- 1 3. A method as recited in Claim 1, wherein the steps are performed by a TCP
- 2 application of an operating system of a network infrastructure element.
- 1 4. A method as recited in Claim 1, wherein the steps are performed by a TCP process,
- 2 stack, adapter or agent hosted by or associated with an operating system of a personal
- 3 computer, workstation or other network end station.
- 1 5. A method as recited in Claim 1, wherein the maximum window size comprises a
- 2 maximum TCP sequence value window size that an endpoint node in the TCP connection can
- 3 manage without regard to any change in current window size that either endpoint may
- 4 establish during the TCP connection.

| 2 | A method as recited in Claim 1, wherein the determining step comprises determining whether the ACK value is equal |
|---|---|
| _ | who can are a compared to the |

re-assembly buffer.

to an expected ACK value or a range of values less than an initial sequence

4 value window; and

wherein the discarding step comprises discarding the TCP segment when the ACK value is equal to an expected ACK value or a range of values less than an initial sequence value window.

- 1 7. A method of preventing an attack on a network, wherein the attack comprises 2 injecting a spurious transmission control protocol (TCP) segment into a TCP connection 3 between a sender and a receiver the method comprising the computer-implemented steps of: 4 receiving a first TCP segment carrying a sequence value; 5 determining whether the sequence value is equal to a next expected sequence value; 6 when the sequence value is equal to a next expected sequence value, determining 7 whether data carried in the first TCP segment overlaps data carried in one or 8 more second TCP segments that were previously received in a re-assembly 9 buffer; and 10 discarding the one or more second TCP segments from the re-assembly buffer when 11 the first TCP segment overlaps any data segment previously received in the
- 8. A method as recited in Claim 7, wherein the discarding step comprises discarding all
 TCP segments that are in the re-assembly buffer.
- 9. A method as recited in Claim 7, wherein the data carried in the first TCP segment overlaps data carried in the one or more second TCP segments that were previously received in the re-assembly buffer when a first sum of a first sequence value and data length carried in the first TCP segment is less than a second sequence value carried in any of the second segments.

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- 1 10. A method as recited in Claim 7, wherein the discarding step is performed when the
- 2 first TCP segment completely overlaps any data segment previously received in the re-
- 3 assembly buffer.
- 1 11. A method as recited in Claim 7, further comprising the step of sending an
- 2 acknowledgment message that acknowledges data the sequence values of the first TCP
- 3 segment.
- 1 12. A method as recited in Claim 7, wherein the steps are performed by an endpoint node
- 2 acting as the receiver of data in the TCP connection.
- 1 13. A method as recited in Claim 7, wherein the steps are performed by a TCP
- 2 application of an operating system of a network infrastructure element.
- 1 14. A method as recited in Claim 7, wherein the steps are performed by a TCP process,
- 2 stack, adapter or agent hosted by or associated with an operating system of a personal
- 3 computer, workstation or other network end station.
- 1 15. An apparatus for preventing an attack on a network, wherein the attack comprises
- 2 sending a spurious transmission control protocol (TCP) segment with a spurious or unwanted
- 3 DATA, comprising means for performing any of the steps of Claims 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9,
- 4 10, 11, 12, 13, or 14.

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- 16. An apparatus for preventing an attack on a network, wherein the attack comprises
- 2 sending a spurious transmission control protocol (TCP) segment with spurious or
- 3 unwanted DATA, comprising:
- 4 a processor;
- one or more stored sequences of instructions that are accessible to the processor and
- 6 which, when executed by the processor, cause the processor to carry out the
- 7 steps of any of Claims 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, or 14.

1 17. A computer-readable medium carrying one or more sequences of instructions for preventing an attack on a network, wherein the attack comprises sending a spurious transmission control protocol (TCP) segment with unwanted or spurious DATA, wherein the execution of the one or more sequences of instructions by one or more processors causes the one or more processors to perform the steps of any of Claims 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, or 14.